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Abstract
In this paper we consider stable marriage problem under the Monte Carlo
simulations. We investigate how correlation in lists of preferrences can affect
simulation results such as: relaxation time, time distribution of relaxation
times etc. We took into account attractiveness of individuals and it’s different
types as well as personal taste.
1. Introduction
We revisited problem well known from the game theory: the stable mar-
riage problem [11], which is also widely used in economics etc. In this problem
two sets of agents (e.g. men and women) must be mathed pairwise in accor-
dance to their mutual preferrences. Those preferrences could be in conflict,
and agents are egoistic in addition. That means, each of them tries to max-
imise its own satisfaction (find the best partner) without respecting the rest.
However there is virtually impossible to make all of the agents absolutely
happy, there are some states where they are more less satisfied with their
partners and can’t change them anymore. These states are known as stable
states or Nash equilibria. Precisely this equilibrium it is the situation, where
there is no such two agents from opposite sets, whose both prefer to be to-
gether instead of staying with their actual partners in other words there is
no unstable pairs. Usually there is several possible stable states in one set.
Most of simulations of matching problem use deterministic algorithms
to find the stable states. It works well quick and elegant, but we wanted
to focus on another aspect of stable marriage problem. We needed more
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realistic model, because we wanted to investigate system’s relaxation time
(not only find stable state itself) in ”real life” situation, which is the time
of reaching the stable state. We also wanted to know how this time can be
affected by system size and correlations of the preferrences lists.
In deterministic ”classical” case each agent from one set knows all the
agents from opposite set, and have a list of them in order of preferrence.
Algorithm chooses optimal order of encounters, to minimize time needed to
reach the stable state. In real life, people don’t know all of their potential
partners at the beginning, and we can assume that people meet each other
randomly. To simulate this we used Monte Carlo simulations. In this case
the encounters between agents are random.
In real populations attractiveness of individuals differs from one to an-
other. It’s very important fact and we considered this, by introducing some
kind of beauty factors which caused a correlations between the lists of pre-
ferrences. Our assumption was similiar to the one prestented in [12], but
we introduced beauty in different way. We noticed that people can have
also different tastes and types of beauty, and simulated this by introducing
attraciveness, and taste vectors, which seems to be more realistic and more
detailed than in above paper.
In our survey we compared different correlations strength (different di-
mensions of attraciveness and taste vectors - the greater dimension, the
weaker correlation) and uncorrelated case as well. Article is focused on in-
fluence of such correlations on the relaxaton time.
2. Model
Described model is a simple model of stable marriage problem, mentioned
above. The goal is to rich the stable state, but, as it has been said, we used
Monte Carlo simulations instead of common used deterministic algorithm.
There are sets of N men M = {m1, m2, m3, ..., mN} and N women W =
{w1, w2, w3, ..., wN}. Each agent has it’s own preference list of opposite sex
representants. This is simply a subjective ranking list of attractivness of
potential partners from opposite sex. Let’s define two matrices: Pm for men
and Pw for women, where Pm(mi, wj) element denotes the rank of the woman
wj on the ranking list of the man mi, and the Pw(wj, mi) denotes the rank of
the man mi on the ranking list of the woman wj. The lower rank, the higher
position.
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Agents from opposite sets must be matched pairwise to create collection
of R = (m,w)ii=1,...,N relatonships, to do this one have to arrange encounters
between them. There are two different ways of this arrangement. In deter-
ministic case - the order of encounters is determined by the preferrences lists,
in MC case - order is random.
2.1. Dynamics
In each time step we arrange random encounter between opposite sets
representants.
During each encounter both of the potential partners check their mutual
attractiveness and may declare a will to commit to a new partnership. An
agent declares such will when is free (has no partner), or when potential new
partner is higher on preferences list (P is lower) than it’s current partner . If
both of them declare they willing, their break up their previous relationships
(if they have ones) and the new one between them is created.
Only if Pm(m
′
i, w
′
j) < Pm(m
′
i, wj) or m
′
i has no partner, and Pw(w
′
j , w
′
i) <
Pw(w
′
j, wi) or m
′
j has no partner, the new relationship is created. Where
primmed are the people who ere doing the meeting, and unprimmed are their
actual partners (mi is in relation with wi mi, wi and mj with wj mj, wj).
The simulation ends while there is no such pair of agents, which can
change it’s partners. This state is called a stable state, or the Nash equilib-
rium. Usually there are several possible stable states for one set.
2.2. Preferrences lists
We have made simulations for two common types of preferrences lists.
First was the most classical case: random lists, and the second more realistic:
correlated ones.
2.2.1. Random lists
Random list construction is very simple. Each agent have such a list,
with oppsite sex representants in random order. However it’s simple, seems
to be quite unrealistic [12]. As we know people differs in their attractiveness
from person to person. Random lists don’t take this fact into account.
2.2.2. Correlated lists
Construction of correlated lists is little more complicated than in ran-
dom case. People are different, their have different attacitveness and tastes
as well. However that was claimed in [12], we did it in somehow different
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way. Our approach takes into account different tastes, and different types of
beauty. We can describe attracitveness by one number, but we can use several
numbers (vector) to describe different aspects of its. Let A(a1, a2, a3, ..., an)
be a vector describing agents’s attractiveness, and T (t1, t2, t3, ..., tn) will be
another vector to describe individual’s taste, where n is number of those as-
pects. Numbers in A are real and randomly chosen from division < 0, 1 >,
and could describe different qualities of attractiveness, such as beauty, intel-
ligence etc. Numbers in T are describing attention paid to given quality in
potential mate evaluation, or in other words: ”weigths” and they are differ-
ent for different agents. On the beginning they are also randomly chosen real
numbers from division < 0, 1 >, but this vector is to be normalised later, so
|T | = 1.
When there are A and T vectors, created for all the agents, we have
to make preferrences lists. Whole procedure is quite simple. An agent i
evaluates all agents from opposite set one by one and sort them by obtained
score S, the higher score - the higher place on preferrences list of an agent.
Where evaluation of agent j by agent i is just a simple scalar product: S =
Ti·Aj. When preferrences lists are ready, simulation starts, and runs until
stable state is reached.
3. Results
We investigated relaxation times τ , which means number of MC steps
needed to reach a stable state. It was done for different number of agents,
and for different types of preferences lists. In general there was two common
types of that lists: correlated and random ones. As we found, τ strongly
depends on list type (see fig. 1).
For strongly correlated preferences lists τ is very small . Extremal case
of correlation is situation where agents from one sex have identical lists. It
takes place when n = 1. For random lists, agents have different lists and τ
is much greater.
In case of correlated lists when n is greater, also the τ is greater, but for
higher n differences are smaller. Even for n > 1000 there is still huge gap
between τ for correlated and random lists. In correlated case function τ(N)
satisfies power law for some N < Nc and then grows much faster. For n = 1
power law is satisfied for all(?) N . Suprising is fact that for some system’s
size there is optimal n = no value for which relaxation time is minimal, for
N > 350, no = 1, but for 50 < N < 350, no = 2.
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Suprising is fact that even for such small N as N = 20 the size of τ
gap between uncorellated and correlated cases is about 103 ,which is really
spectacular difference.
5 10 15 20
101
102
103
104
105
τ(N)
N
τ
 
 
n=1
n=10
n=100
n=1000
random
Figure 1: Median of τ(N) for different types of preferrences lists in log-log scale, where
n is number of qualities decribing attractivness. Each result was is average of 100 MC
simulations.
4. Discussion
As it has been shown, the more correlated lists the shorter relaxation
times τ for N > 350.
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Figure 2: Median of τ(N) for two different n values log-log scale, where n is number of
qualities decribing attractivness. Each result was is average of 100 MC simulations.
In other words: the more common tastes or more different individuals are,
the shorter times occur. One can claim a hypothesis that for shorter mating
times, also reproduction is more effective. An assumption that only stable
marriages can have children, implies that younger couple can have more
children thand older ones. Therefore natural selection could prefer some
kind of common taste and diversity of individuals, to maximise offspring
count and minimise cost of sexual selection.
For smaller N there are some other differences. Suprising is fact that for
smaller groups this time is minimal for n > 1 (see fig. 2) which means weaker
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correlation, stronger personalisation. For some reason in small groups, some
weakening of correlation which means more idividualisation, causes quicker
mathing.
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